- ISBN13: 9781586483814
- Condition: NEW
- Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
Product Description
A dramatic account of one of the most spectacular economic melt-downs of modern times; “an extraordinary tale of bad policy and financial gluttony.” (Wall Street Journal) In 2001 Argentina suffered one of the most sensational crashes in modern history. With it came appalling social and political chaos, a collapse of the peso, and a wrenching downturn that threw millions into poverty and left nearly one-quarter of the workforce unemployed. Paul Blustein shows how … More >>
And the Money Kept Rolling In Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina
Tags: Argentina, Bankrupting, Kept, Money, Rolling, Street, Wall
In his previous book, punishment, Paul Blustein was on a quest to understand what happened to the economies affected by the Asian currency and financial turmoil that began with the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997. Even if you did not avoid the costly mistakes underline that were made in response to the crisis, its aim was to blame, but to understand what had happened and to share their sense of wonder that the crisis could take place as new.
Four years later, Paul Blustein is back, but its “coefficient of indignation,” as stated in the introduction, is substantially higher. According to him, not the debacle of Argentina 2001-2002 only illustrates the risks inherent in the modern international finance, but also a case of condemnation of personal arrogance, unbridled greed and myopia institutional environment in which the international community, in particular , “flew.” Charting the path that began with the adoption of a new currency tightly pegged to the dollar in 1991 and the next episode of growth that followed, described the growing imbalances resulting from massive capital inflows from international investors led irrational exuberance who all went on unchecked by the IMF. This complicity of government officials, investors on Wall Street and Washington Sentinels money in the creation of a bubble has been compounded by the inability of political leaders and their international advisers to provide an exit strategy for the convertibility regime and ensure a “soft landing” or at least minimize the impact of the financial collapse of the population. In fact, Blustein makes the case that the prolonged rescue effort orchestrated by the IMF and U.S. Treasury only prolong the agony and Argentina made the fall even more devastating in the end.
Blustein based his argument on extensive interviews with all key stakeholders, including the Argentine economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, and IMF Managing Director Horst Kohler. Also had access to a wealth of documents including internal memos, confidential reports and notes of the meeting, and it seems that I read them all. At any time, the reconstruction of internal debate, sets out the policy options, and weigh the pros and cons that have been made by the main institutional actors when decisions were taken and in retrospect. But Blustein is not just a journalist who writes well, works hard and knows how to get sources to speak. He also knows the professional literature on financial crises and clearly has a solid understanding of the fundamental debates on the subject. The allegations that he performed for the international financial community should be taken seriously.
Blustein makes it clear that Argentina’s problems were mainly the result of the misdeeds of their leaders country have spent more than they should, with a tax lower than they should, and ask paid more than they should, while maintaining a currency system has led to much stricter fiscal discipline. You could see the writing on the wall and clung to a U.S. dollar equal to the financial hemorrhaging has stabilized the banking system, destroyed the life savings of people and caused enormous damage to the economy.
But the international financial community, investors, especially in the world and to a lesser extent, the IMF and Treasury officials, also forms part of a share of responsibility. First, Blustein is the case already known that conflicts of interests and asymmetric incentives for investment driven operators too short-term capital to Argentina without due consideration to the risks involved. Particularly noteworthy is the treatment megaswap Wall Street promotes the government in June 2001 and aggravated the debt burden of the country, causing heavy taxes for the banks involved.
The IMF, for its part, has shown a “lack of intellectual courage” in the words of his former chief economist Michael Mussa. He used Argentina as a poster child when they began to send warnings to the authorities, their growth projections based on optimistic assumptions, clinging to a voluntary approach to debt restructuring, while it should have provided a regular exercise twice losing a bet when he extended a second loan package that the conditions were clearly not sustainable, has submitted plans and delay the moment of truth, when the U.S. dollar parity had to be abandoned. Almost step of the way, Blustein argues that the crisis could be mitigated if there could have been avoided.
IMF credit, you must recognize that every decision is hotly debated at that time, all the movements that have been approved, if not, sometimes dictated by the United States and other G7 countries, and that the institution has taken the guilt and repented publicly in a series of evaluation reports.
concern particular, is the argument that the rules of the game of globalization Blustein are rigged and that countries like Argentina are given false hope that they can play the game of the countries rich industrialized countries may be denied access last minute and thrown into poverty in a more cruel and painful. If there is an injury, then the system is in urgent need of fixing.
Rating: 5 / 5
I ran a desktop Latin American capital markets in New York during this crazy time in Argentina, so I’m intimately familiar with what Paul wrote about Blustein. His book is a very fair and balanced account of what, why and how it happened without the tabloid story to tell.
I recommend it to anyone who wants to understand what happened in Argentina and the IMF.
Rating: 5 / 5
After finishing and the money rolled in, I was reminded of the observation that, despite appearances, disasters do not occur spontaneously. Instead, they are usually the result of a series of small errors compound to devastating events become memorable. Blustein must have taken note of the same observation as it passes the critical time and effort to document the “small” errors after the Argentine default. In this way, it exposes the greed, stubbornness, and political cowardice that makes this vortex, as it was devastating. Blustein also has much to emphasize that these emotions are still prevalent in financial markets and government posts, with another financial collapse like Argentina and inevitable that more than a fluke.
The book works on all levels. It is a comprehensive analysis of (probably) the biggest financial crisis in recent history, a warning with solutions to avoid repeating the crisis, and an affordable, fun read. Given these qualities, it is likely that the money involved and join in on the secret of the Temple by William Greider as one of the final texts to shed light on the integration of financial markets and government fiscal policy.
Rating: 5 / 5
This is very readable presentation of the animated story of how Argentina has overcome decades of monetary mismanagement and put in the path of economic growth during the 1990s only to fall into economic chaos. We recommend this book to those interested in international finance, but suffers a bit of a moral tone, as author Paul Blustein point the finger at international banks and brokerage firms. One can even hope to understand a little “more about what happened to the billions of dollars flowing into Argentina during the boom years soon. But the analysis of experts Blustein (organized around the metaphorical references musical “Evita”) says a lot about the dark side of globalization, and points out some serious problems, apparently the applicants in the international financial system. Most instructive is his observation that the elements of experience in Argentina is now evident the flow of funds into emerging markets for new favored by international investors. Therefore, this book unfortunately may be a harbinger of things to come.
Rating: 5 / 5
I read this book in October 2007 during a business trip a week in Buenos Aires.
At the time, Cristina Kirchner – Cristina! CRISTINA! CRISTINA! Titles sung – on his way to his coronation.
I was so far ahead in the polls, thanks to a simple charm and the drive of her husband, outgoing President Nestor Kirchner that “Queen Cristina” no need to campaign.
Now, more than a year later, Christine has proven to be a disaster. Of course, everyone ran headlong into the disaster in 2008. . . but Argentina as the country has just got the added indignity of lowering MSCI classification of “emerging market” to “frontier” market.
strong restrictions on capital flows Cristina are to blame. Buenos Aires, known as the “Paris of Latin America”, is now closer to the capital of Belarus or Kyrgyzstan. . . at least to go to investment opportunities. You can put money in, but we can not get insurance again.
Here in early 2009, this book is a timely and compelling, for reasons that go beyond Argentina. If you want to understand better what is happening in the world, the tragic collapse of Paul Blustein account balance of a country may provide some clues.
While the book is a crime scene CSI-style to unravel all the mistakes on the way to transform the implosion of Argentina century (soon to be repeated?) Post dirt-analysis also shows rescue profound foresight.
In the final pages, Blustein notes that the author could place a similar texture to the United States one day. He was right. . . and, indeed, also for Europe.
As I write these words, Obama’s new government is grappling with the fact or not the nationalization of the U.S. “zombie banks” as the hole grows deeper and less radical solutions seem increasingly powerless every day.
It appears more “conservative” in Europe, meanwhile, expressed as the value of many billions of toxic assets still left exposure on their books, with “conservative” European banks are levering up to even greater extent than their cohorts American cowboys.
In many ways, the ‘Europe and the UK problems worse than the Americans, in fact, due to the presence of banks that are not only “too big to fail” but “too big to save” – or the size of the risk profiles of European banks “are greater than the entire GDP of the host country! />
Once again, the needs of the situation Current back to tie Blustein is excellent news that revealed a crazy and lessons learned (or perhaps not learned).
For example, one of my favorite nuggets and money that came rolling in (and out) “is a wonderfully descriptive phrase IMF:” The explosion debt dynamics.
The explosion debt dynamics refers to the point of no return beyond which no return in terms of charge himself with the bonds of one country can not be refunded. Once in the grip of EDD actually imploding rather than exploding. It ’s the type of explosive compound interest rate that leads to the collapse of hope. On the one hand, decreases the likelihood of ongoing financial viability to zero, causing terror to escape creditors.
Many now wonder at what point explosive debt dynamics will swallow United States. This point is much more than many people now believe, if only because the U.S. prints remain the world’s reserve currency and because, as bad as Uncle Sam’s balance sheet is, the budgets in Europe and Japan are in fact much worse. The scenario is quite close, however, make some very scary possibilities (and highly profitable business opportunities).
In an interview with Barron’s excellent Ray Dalio, founder of the international money management Bridgewater Associates, Dalio talks about how the global economy is slogging through a “D-process” – the term to describe how the dynamics of our current situation are very, very different from the dynamics of the more “normal” recessions in the past.
Dalio to read about the Great Depression of 1930 and the “lost decade” of Japan to get an idea of what a process-D look and feel. “And the money came rolling in (and out)” still counts as a story now and another good start in this.
Last but not least, it is ironic that ten ago years ago this month (February 2009), the cover of February 1999 magzine time with the heads of three smug-looking men – Robert Rubin, Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers – over a caption that sounded “The Committee to Save the World.” .. the word “SAVE” extra-jumbo characters.
Next to that, a roar least February 99 cover of Time adds: “The inside story of how three Marketeers have prevented the collapse of the global economy – until now. “
Ten years later, the” Three Marketeers, “have to say for themselves? Little more than” Oops, our bad … Only it was not really our fault. Good />.
One can only hope that books like books of this collapse in Argentina, and the flow of the safe to keep the news of the collapse of Wall Street, the disappearance of venerable institutions on both sides of Atlantic, and perhaps even the interruption of the same Western Finance will provide a little insight and a bit more humility in the future for more “rational” to continue.
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Rating: 5 / 5